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Case No. 20040177-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error in not ensuring that Zamora was 
present during all stages of the proceedings against him, or had waived on the record his 
right to be present? This Court will review claims not preserved in the record for plain 
error. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346. To demonstrate plain error, a 
defendant must establish that "(1) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993). 
2. Whether Zamora was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
l 
of counsel at trial? A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, "ineffective assistance of 
counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal 
question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 
1995). 
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Ultiminio Zamora appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Third District Court after he was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping, a first 
degree felony; and three counts of aggravated sexual assault, all first degree felonies. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
In an information filed November 30, 1999 Zamora was charged with one count 
of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony and four counts of aggravated sexual 
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assault of first degree felonies (R. 2-5). A warrant of arrest for Zamora was issued the 
same day (R. 1). Zamora was booked into custody in Salt Lake City on November 18, 
2002 (R. 6). On January 28, 2003 a Preliminary Hearing was held, after which Zamora 
was bound over to answer the charges of count one aggravated kidnapping a first degree 
felony and counts two through four aggravated sexual assault first degree felonies (R. 
23-24; 155 at 39-40). Count five aggravated sexual assault was dismissed (R. 155 at 39-
40). Zamora's arraignment was held February 35 2003 at which he entered pleas of not 
guilty to all of the charges (R. 25-26; 156 at 2). 
After several continuances, a two day jury trial was held on February 18th and 19th 
2004, after which defendant was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping a first degree 
felony and three counts of aggravated sexual assault all fist degree felonies (R. 98-99; 
109-111; 158; 159). On April 12, 2004 Zamora was sentenced to a term of not less than 
fifteen years no more than life for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, and not less 
than fifteen years, no more than life on count two aggravated sexual assault, to run 
consecutively to count one, the aggravated kidnapping. On counts three and four, 
aggravated sexual assault, Zamora was sentenced to not less than fifteen years, no more 
than life in prison true and concurrently with the other sentences (R. 128-130; 160 at 8-
9). 
Zamora filed a notice of appeal, pro-se, on February 25, 2004 (R. 113-114). On 
April 16, 2004, counsel for the defendant from Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, 
filed an amended Notice of Appeal (R. 131-133). On March 19, 2004 the Supreme 
Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition (R. 118-119). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
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Testimony of Beatriz Exparza 
Beatriz Esparza was born on November 19, 1983 (R. 158 at 13). Esparza knows 
Zamora as her brother-in-law, married to her sister Teresa Zamora (R. 158 at 14). 
Esparza positively identified Zamora during the trial (Record 158 at 14 and 15). Esparza 
refers to Zamora as Armando (Record 158 at 15). 
Esparza states that she saw Zamora on October 15, 1999 in the afternoon at about 
7:00 in the alley behind her mother's house at 221 East 1300 South in Salt Lake County 
when she was 15 years old (R. 158 at 15-16). Esparza was walking out of her mother's 
house when Zamora pulled up in his car (R. 158 at 16). Zamora asked where she was 
going and Esparza told him she was going to a friend's house, and he said he would take 
her, so Esparza got in Zamora's car and left (R. 158 at 16). Zamora told Esparza that he 
was going to stop at a motel where people were drinking and asked her if she wanted to 
stop and have a drink, to which she responded yes (R. 158 at 16 and 17). They stopped 
at motel a bit past 17th South and State Street (R. 158 at 17). When they arrived at the 
motel Zamora drove right up to the room where they went in, but no one else was present 
(R. 158 at 17). Zamora said some people were going to be there any minute and they sat 
and talked for a minute (R. 158 at 17). Esparza described the motel room as including a 
bed, T.V., a desk, and a night stand (R. 158 at 17 and 18). Esparza stated that while she 
was in the room with Zamora, nobody else came in the motel room until someone came 
knocking and then left right away (R. 158 at 18). 
Esparza stated that when they first arrived they were just having a beer and talking 
(R. 158 at 18). At some point Esparza decided to leave, but when she got up to walk out 
of the door Zamora stood in front of her and told her that she wasn't leaving (R. 158 at 
19). Esparza tried to walk out but Zamora wouldn't let her (R. 158 at 19). Esparza tried 
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to push Zamora out of the way but he pushed her onto the bed (R. 158 at 19). He then 
told her to take her clothes off but Esparza didn't comply (R. 158 at 19). Zamora then 
removed Esparza's clothes without Esparza's help (R. 158 at 19). After Zamora 
removed her clothes, Esparza stated Zamora put his penis inside of her, that she asked 
him why he was doing it and that he told her because of her sister, that she took 
everything away from him and made life so bad for him that he was going to do it to her 
(R. 158 at 20). Esparza stated that she tried to get away from him but that Zamora started 
choking her and told her to just let things happen and it would be over (R. 158 at 20). 
Esparza stated that Zamora choked her so hard she couldn't breathe (R. 158 at 20). Next 
Esparza stated Zamora "did what he had to do" and that he would stop and keep drinking 
and do lines of cocaine (R. 158 at 20). Esparza made other attempts to get out of the 
motel room but Zamora would just grab her and throw her on the bed and tell her that she 
wasn't leaving (R. 158 at 20). Esparza stated that she tried to cry out for help, that she 
could hear somebody in the next room and tried to scream but that Zamora would cover 
her mouth and start choking her (R. 158 at 20 and 21). 
Esparza remembers Zamora choking her three times (R. 158 at 21). Esparza 
stated because it had been almost five years that she didn't remember everything in order 
but that she remembers it like a dream and that she didn't remember everything in detail 
(R. 158 at 21). Esparza stated that there was another time that Zamora put his penis in 
her and that it was maybe a couple hours after the first time (R. 158 at 21 and 22). 
Esparza stated that she didn't sleep at all that night (R. 158 at 22). She also stated that 
Zamora put his fingers inside her and made her put his penis inside her mouth (R. 158 at 
22). Esparza stated that she didn't want to do those things (R. 158 at 22 and 23). 
Esparza said that she would ask Zamora why he was doing that to her and that he would 
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just tell her that it was her sister's fault (R. 158 at 23). Esparza further stated that when 
she would start screaming that Zamora would make her take cocaine so that she would 
quiet and calm down (R. 158 at 23). Esparza couldn't remember how many times this 
happened but that it made her feel numb (R. 158 at 23). After she took the cocaine 
Esparza stated she wouldn't scream anymore that she would just lay there, and that when 
it would start to wear off she would start screaming again (R. 158 at 23 and 24). Esparza 
remembers trying to get out of the motel room three or four times but that she never 
succeeded (R. 158 at 24). Esparza remembers in the morning when the sun had come out 
that Zamora threatened to kill her R. 158 at 24). Esparza also confirmed that she told 
Zamora all night and all morning that she didn't want those things to happen and that she 
wanted to leave (R. 158 at 24). 
At about 11:00 in the morning when the manager came and knocked on the door 
and said that it was time to go, Esparza was able to leave the motel room (R. 158 at 25). 
Zamora then took her home where Esparza went to her room and her brother came down 
stairs and Esparza told him what had happened (R. 158 at 25). Esparza's brother then 
told her dad and they called the cops (R. 158 at 25). Esparza stated she spoke to the cops 
the same day she came home and that she went to the hospital for an examination on the 
same day (R. 158 at 25). Esparza stated that she had bruises from what had happened 
and that pictures had been taken (R. 158 at 25-26). 
Going back to the events in the motel room, Esparza stated that there were two 
separate times that Zamora put his penis in her vagina and that those times were 
separated by maybe and hour or two (R. 158 at 27). In between those times Zamora 
would just sit there and talk and tell Esparza everything that her sister used to do to him 
and "things like that" (R. 158 at 27). Esparza didn't know whether Zamora ejaculated 
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either time during the intercourse (R. 158 at 27). 
Esparza stated that there had been a time close to the 15th and 16th of October that 
she had consensual intercourse with her children's dad, Chris Garcia (R. 158 at 27 and 
28). She stated that that would have been a day or two before the events of the motel 
room (R. 158 at 28). Esparza further stated that although she remembers speaking with 
the police on the day she came home from the motel room and speaking to them a few 
weeks after that, she didn't remember very well what she had said to them (R. 158 at 28). 
Esparza stated that she hasn't talked to very many people about these events and that she 
thinks about it sometimes such as if she is watching a movie, and something happens but 
not too much (R. 158 at 29). Esparza also stated that she hadn't seen Zamora from the 
time he dropped her off after the motel room until she saw him in court (R. 158 at 30). 
During cross-examination, Esparza acknowledged that she had reviewed the 
police reports and transcripts of her last testimony as recently as the morning of the trial 
(R. 158 at 31). Esparza admitted that she first told the police that Zamora had forced her 
into a car but acknowledged that wasn't true (R. 158 at 32-33). She also acknowledged 
that she was in custody in Juvenile Detention when she spoke to the officers some weeks 
after she had first spoken to them about the incident (R. 158 at 33 and 34). Esparza also 
acknowledged it's possible she might have lied to the police previously (R. 158 at 34). 
During redirect examination Esparza, stated it was her intention to tell the truth to 
the police officers and that she remained in the detention center even after answering the 
questions (R. 158 at 37 and 38). Esparza also acknowledged that she had previously told 
the detective something that wasn't true (R. 158 at 39). Esparza further stated that she 
told the police something different than going in the car willingly with Zamora because 
she guessed she was scared and that she thought they were going to think that she got in 
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the car willingly so it was her fault (R. 158 at 40). She also didn't want her mom to think 
that she was going out drinking (R. 158 at 40). 
Testimony of Teresa Zamora 
Teresa Zamora is the sister of Beatriz Esparza and the wife of the defendant 
Zamora (R. 158 at 44-45). Mrs. Zamora testified that the defendant Zamora is also 
known by Armando, and that they were married fifteen or sixteen years ago and have 
four children (R. 158 at 45). Mrs. Zamora stated that in September and October of 1999 
that she and Zamora were having problems in their marriage and that she wanted a 
divorce (R. 158 at 54). Mrs. Zamora did not see the defendant Zamora in Salt Lake City 
during September or October of 1999, however, in response to the question "Do you 
know whether he visited your children?" Mrs. Zamora responded yes (R. 158 at 54). 
On the 16th of October Mrs. Zamora found out something happened with her sister 
Beatriz (R. 158 at 54). Mrs. Zamora testified that she spoke to police officers that day 
and went with them to different houses to try to locate the defendant Zamora (R. 158 at 
54 and 55). At one of the houses Mrs. Zamora found some photos of her husband, the 
defendant Zamora, which the police officer showed to her and that she positively 
identified as Armando Zamora (R. 158 at 55). Mrs. Zamora did not see her husband or 
hear from him, nor did the children have any visits with him after October 16th (R. 158 at 
55and 56) 
Testimony of Martin Chairez 
Martin Chairez has been a friend of the Zamora's since they were children in 
Mexico (R. 158 at 57). Chairez stated that on October 15, 1999 that he saw Zamora (R. 
158 at 57 and 58). Chairez stated that Zamora came to his house on that date and asked 
8 
him to rent him a room because he didn't have the money to rent his own room (R. 158 at 
58). Zamora wanted him to rent him a room on State Street at a motel by the name of 
Capitolio, and Chairez stated that he did that for Zamora on October 15 (R. 158 at 58). 
Chairez stated that Zamora told him that the reason he wanted a room was that he was 
going to bring a woman (R. 158 at 58 and 59). Chairez stated that he did not see Zamora 
again (R. 158 at 59). 
During cross-examination, Chairez stated that he used his identification and his 
name and address at the time he checked in at the motel (R. 158 at 59). He also stated 
that he since had heard that the room was site of an aggravated sexual assault from the 
officer (R. 158 at 59). 
Testimony of Officer Nick Deland 
Officer Nick Deland is employed by the Salt Lake City Police Department and 
was working in that capacity on October 16, 1999 (R. 158 at 61). On that date he was 
asked to investigate a rape and a KIDNAPING (R. 158 at 61). Officer Deland went to 
where the victim was residing at 221 East on 1300 South in Salt Lake and spoke with the 
victim Beatriz Esparza (R. 158 at 61-62). Miss Esparza described to the officer the 
things that had happened to her5 but the officer didn't recall what her demeanor was as 
she was speaking (R. 158 at 62). Officer Deland's purpose in speaking to her was to 
substantiate the allegations that were levied at the time of the KIDNAPING and rape and 
he attempted to get a detailed report on what had happened with her (R. 158 at 62). 
Officer Deland obtained a description of the motel which he identified as the 
Capital Motel (R. 158 at 63). He went there at 1749 South State Street in Salt Lake 
County. Officer Deland testified that he received information about a possible specific 
room and that he went to room numbers 32 and 33 (R. 158 at 64). When he went to 
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room number 33 it had already been cleaned by the motel staff so he didn't go in to look 
around there, however, he did go into room 32 which had not been cleaned (R. 158 at 64 
and 65). Officer Deland testified that he obtained the registration information for rooms 
32, 33 and 34, and over the hearsay objection of counsel, stated that room 32 was 
registered to Elisa Olsen, room 33 was registered to Martin Chairez, and 34 was 
registered to Anthony Kelly (R. 158 at 65-66). 
Officer Deland testified that he followed up on the registration information and 
eventually contacted Martin Chairez (R. 158 at 66). As part of his investigation he also 
tried to locate Zamora and elicit the assistance of other people involved in law 
enforcement (R. 158 at 66 and 67). On October 16th Officer Deland went to different 
residences in an effort to locate Mr. Zamora; however the officer did not find him (R. 
158 at 67). 
During cross-examination, Officer Deland stated that when he spoke to the 
alleged victim, she told him that she was taken by force by the suspect and pulled into his 
car and taken to a motel room (R. 158 at 68). Officer Deland also testified that he didn't 
recall the alleged victim being uncertain or waffling about the facts when she related that 
information to the officer (R. 158 at 68 and 69). 
Testimony of James Chandler 
James Chandler is a retired detective at the Salt Lake City Police Department but 
was employed in that capacity with the Sex Crimes Investigation Unit in October of 1999 
(R. 158 at 70). He was assigned to the case involving Defendant Zamora and was the 
detective responsible for that case (R. 158 at 71). As part of his investigation, Detective 
Chandler interviewed Beatriz Esparza at the Salt Lake County Juvenile Detention Center 
about three weeks after the incident occurred (R. 158 at 71). Detective Chandler also 
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tried to follow up on information obtained by other police officers regarding the people 
that had rented rooms 32 and 34 (R. 158 at 71). The records showed their names, date of 
birth, address and driver's license numbers (R. 158 at 71 and 72). He recalls he went to 
the address given for those two people but was not able to contact either of them but left 
his business card requesting that they contact him but he never heard back from them (R. 
158 at 72). Detective Chandler wanted to get in touch with these people to talk to them 
about anything they may have seen or heard that night (R. 158 at 72). Detective 
Chandler also tried to locate defendant Zamora by contacting his wife, Mr. Chairez, 
Zamora5 s employer, and obtaining the information from Beatriz Esparza herself (R. 158 
at 72). Detective Chandler stated that he was never successful in locating Zamora (R. 
158 at 72). 
Detective Chandler stated a code R examination was done in the case, which is a 
forensic exam done by a person who was trained in the medical area of this type of 
evidence gathering, and includes an examination of the exterior as well as internal areas 
of the victim's body to gather any evidence of an alleged crime or incident that may have 
occurred (R. 158 t 72-73). Detective Chandler stated that swabs collected as part of the 
code R examination were eventually taken to the state crime lab (R. 158 at 73). 
During cross-examination, Detective Chandler confirmed that the information he 
received of the occupancy of room 32 and 34 could be identified with something he 
considered worthy of follow up, and that one of the reasons it was worthy of follow up 
was because the alleged victim had described screaming on a number of different 
occasions (R. 158 at 74). Detective Chandler also confirmed that the alleged victim 
described to him the walls seemed thin enough that she could hear people talking in the 
other rooms (R. 158 at 74). Detective Chandler stated he didn't see anything in his 
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report that suggested the crime lab team, for example, went to room 33 for the collection 
of finger prints or other prints as evidence, nor did he have any recollection of that (R. 
158 at 77-78). 
During re-direct examination, Detective Chandler stated that he was not assigned 
the case until two days after it occurred and that he didn't have room 33 forensically 
examined because he didn't believe their would be anything of evidentiary value left to 
find at that time (R. 158 at 79). 
Testimony of Delphi Alvarado 
Delphi Alvarado is an employee of the State of Utah and in law enforcement 
capacity and was so employed on October 16, 1999 (R. 158 at 85). On that date he was 
asked to assist in an effort to locate defendant Zamora (R. 158 at 85). In an effort to 
locate Zamora, Alvarado went with Teresa Esparza to different residences (R. 158 at 85). 
Alvarado said that he went to a residence that had some indications that Zamora had been 
staying there, including Polaroid photographs (R. 158 at 86). Alvarado stated that he 
showed the photographs to Teresa Esparza and she was able to identify them (R. 158 at 
86). 
Testimony of Bruce Winch 
Bruce Winch is a general manager for Chuck a Rama and was employed as a 
production manager with Chuck a Rama in October of 1999 (R. 158 at 88). He was 
working at the 6464 South State Street location in Murray in October of 1999 (R. 158 at 
88). Winch remembers speaking to police officers in October of 1999 about one of the 
employees at that restaurant (R. 158 at 88-89). Winch thought the name of the employee 
was Zamora and that there was a person by that name working at the restaurant at that 
time (R. 158 at 89). Winch believed that Zamora had been working there a short time (R. 
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158 at 89). The officer showed Winch a picture but Winch was not able to identify the 
person in the picture at that time (R. 158 at 89). However, when the officer talked to 
Winch about Ultiminio Zamora he recognized that person by name (R. 158 at 89). After 
October 16th of 1999, Winch did not see Zamora at the restaurant again (R. 158 at 89). 
That person, Zamora, did not come in for his other work shift, nor did he pick up a pay 
check that was waiting for him while Winch was in charge of the pay check (R. 158 at 
89-90). 
During cross-examination Winch clarified he didn't recall the police showing him 
a photograph in 1999 but that he just talked to them (R. 158 at 90). Winch also stated 
that at any given time there were approximately sixty people working at the restaurant 
that he was managing (R. 158 at 91). Winch also stated that approximately half the 
workers are Hispanic and that that percentage is relatively consistent (R. 158 at 90). 
Winch also stated that he remembers most people with whom he worked in that capacity, 
but that he didn't remember Zamora when he was shown a picture because "people 
change, pictures change" (R. 158 at 91). Winch also recalls speaking to two people from 
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association who asked whether he remembered the name 
Zamora (R. 158 at 91 and 92). Winch stated that he did recognize the name, first and 
last, but that he couldn't remember whether or not he worked there (R. 158 at 92). 
Testimony of Su Bryner-Brown 
Su Bryner-Brown is a forensic nurse examiner for law enforcement agencies in 
Salt Lake County, Davis County, Summit County and Wasatch County and the 
Department of Corrections (R. 159 at 103). Bryner-Brown had been employed in that 
capacity, full-time for ten years and prior to that had worked assisting physicians at St. 
Mark's Emergency for ten years (R. 159 at 103). Bryner-Brown explained that she 
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responds when a crime is reported to an emergency room, to her clinic, or the Children's 
Justice Center, and does an evidence collection examination on an alleged victim or 
suspect of a sexual assault (R. 159 at 103). Defense counsel stipulated to Bryner-
Brown's qualifications as an expert, even one of the leading experts in the community 
regarding these types of examinations (R. 159 at 104 and 105). 
Bryner-Brown testified that she conducted the examination of Beatriz Esparza on 
October 16, 1999 (R. 159 at 110). Bryner-Brown stated that the exam took over two 
hours (R. 159 at 110). Bryner-Brown initially conducted an interview with Esparza to 
obtain information about what had happened to her (R. 159 at 111). Bryner-Brown 
described Esparza as quiet and tense with brief responses to the questions, and that she 
was hyper-vigilant and had an exaggerated startle response (R. 159 at 111). Bryner-
Brown described hyper-vigilance as when someone.is sitting and they are talking to you, 
that any movement or noise outside the room around them, they are looking wary of who 
is around and trying to make sure their environment if safe (R. 159 at 111). Bryner-
Brown also described the exaggerated startle response as when even when giving 
warning to the patient when you touch them, that they still jump and pull away as 
opposed to a patient most the time who is expecting an examination you can touch them 
as a provider and they don't jump (R. 159 at 112). 
Bryner-Brown explained that during the interview that Esparza described things 
that happened to her that Bryner-Brown would expect to see an injury from (R. 159 at 
112). Esparza described to her penetration of her vagina by both penis and fingers and 
also described choking, full arm, three to four times around the throat and being grabbed 
on the upper arms, and that quite a few of the behaviors could have caused injury (R. 159 
at 112). Bryner-Brown described that at the time of the examination Esparza had red and 
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purple bruising on her throat around the right hand side, and oval bruising on her throat 
that was consistent with bite marks (R. 159 at 112). Esparza also had petechiae around 
her neck and on her face which is described as small red bruises of capillaries bursting on 
the face (R. 159 at 112 and 113). Esparza also had on the left upper arm red and brown 
oval bruises, on the posterior side of the left arm and on the lower left arm she had some 
red and brown oval bruises and on the right wrist (R. 159 at 113). Bryner-Brown stated 
that choking would have caused the petichiae that she observed and that it is caused by 
increased pressure, and that choking is one mechanism that can cause it (R. 159 at 113). 
Bryner-Brown also testified that the injuries were all consistent within a time frame of 
when the alleged incident occurred and the time frame of when she saw Esparza (R. 159 
at 113). Bryner-Brown also identified state's exhibits one through four which were 
copies of photographs which she took when she did the examination of Esparza on 
October 16, 1999 (R. 159 at 114). 
Bryner-Brown identified state's exhibit #5 as a blow-up of the diagram 
documenting where the injuries were on Esparza (R. 159 at 115). Bryner-Brown pointed 
out that there was a red bruise on the right calf, oval bruising on the upper arm and 
bruising on the wrist and the posterior (R. 159 at 115). Bryner-Brown also testified to 
red and purple bruising and suction bruising and a bite mark on the throat, and petichiae 
were under the eyes and on the cheeks (R. 159 at 116). Using the diagram marked as 
state's exhibit #6 Bryner-Brown described a large cut consistent with a fingernail 
avulsion cut just inside Esparza's labia majora (R. 159 at 116). Bryner-Brown further 
explained that in the posterior fourchette were lacerations between five and six o'clock 
and an abrasion from four to six o'clock on the inside of the labia minora (R. 159 at 116 
and 117). Further, on the hymen there was red bruising at the eight o'clock position (R. 
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159 at 117). Bryner-Brown testified that these injuries were also consistent with 
the recent reported injuries, were consistent as being recent within the time frame of 
when the alleged incident occurred (R. 159 at 118). Bryner-Brown further explained that 
she looked for injury because injury can go to issues of lack of consent and that you can 
look scientifically at the rate of injury that occurs in non consenting sexual intercourse 
verses consenting sexual intercourse (R. 159 at 118). Bryner-Brown also acknowledged 
however, that it is possible to see injury during a consensual encounter and that injury 
will occur in about 12% of the patients after consensual sex in one or two sites of injury 
(R. 159 at 120). Bryner-Brown however observed four sites of injury genitally on 
Esparza during her exam (R. 159 at 120). Bryner-Brown stated that Esparza had 
informed her that she had ingested alcohol and cocaine during the incident, and that at 
really high levels some medications including alcohol and cocaine can make it harder at 
high levels of intoxication to become aroused (R. 159 at 120-121). However, because of 
what Esparza told her about not being intoxicated to the point that she was passed out, 
Bryner-Brown stated it would take a really high level to really affect a young girl that age 
that negatively and because she was conscious through it and had remembered what had 
happened, Bryner-Brown concluded that she wasn't that intoxicated (R. 159 at 121). 
Bryner-Brown testified that she also received information about other consenting 
partners of Esparza because sperm hangs around alive for three days and anytime you 
have consenting sex in that time period we have to know that information (R. 159 at 121-
122). Specifically, Esparza said to Bryner-Brown that she'd had a consensual encounter 
with her boyfriend (R. 159 at 122). Bryner-Brown stated that the consenting contact that 
occurred on the 14th, which was considerable distance in terms of healing capabilities 
prior to the alleged incident, and so that keeping that in mind, the consenting sex was not 
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contributing, in her opinion, to the injuries that were seen during the examination (R. 159 
at 122). Bryner-Brown testified that she reached a conclusion that all the findings on 
Esparza's body were consistent with the history that she gave her of the incident which 
was a non-consensual episode (R. 159 atl23). 
During cross-examination, Bryner-Brown confirmed that it was not possible that 
any of the injuries she described to Esparza could have been inflicted at a distance of 
greater than 1,000 miles from the victim and that she couldn't tell from her examination 
who the perpetrator was who caused the injuries (R. 159 at 124). 
Testimony of Diane Malmborg 
Diane Malmborg is employed by the State of Utah in a law enforcement capacity, 
and that apart of her responsibility in that employment she sometimes brings back 
persons who are wanted in the State of Utah who are in other states (R. 159 at 125). 
Malmborg stated that she performed that function with somebody named Ultiminio 
Zamora in approximately October 2002 from Atlanta Georgia (R. 159 at 126). 
During cross-examination, Malmborg testified that Zamora had been in custody 
approximately two months prior to his being extradited back to the State of Utah during 
approximately August/September 2002 (R. 159 at 126). Malmborg acknowledged that 
between the date of the alleged incident which was October of 1999 and the date when 
she came in contact with him or a couple of months prior to that, that she didn't have any 
idea of Zamora's whereabouts (R. 159 at 126 ). 
Testimony of Ultiminio Zamora 
Ultiminio Zamora testified that on September 9, 1999 he was in the custody of 
Immigration in Naturalization Service and that they sent him to Mexico (R. 159 at 130). 
Zamora remembers that it was September 9, 1999, because he had no money to get to 
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down town, that he lived far away across the country all the way to his town, so he took 
time to collect money, to work in the streets for awhile and needed some money to take 
the bus from there to his town (R. 159 at 131). Zamora testified that he was dropped off 
by INS in Juarez, and that Juarez is a Mexican town that is across the border from El 
Paso, Texas (R. 159 at 131). Zamora further stated that his home town in Mexico is 
approximately a sixteen or eighteen hour bus ride from Juarez (R. 159 at 131-132). As 
further explanations, Zamora stated that because he didn't have any money, he stayed 
with some people living in the streets for awhile to try to work for somebody else, and 
collect money but that its hard to collect money so it took days to save the money to get 
the bus to go to his town (R. 159 at 132). Zamora remembers it taking two or three 
weeks working for money in Juarez before he could take the bus home (R. 159 at 132). 
Zamora further testified that he stayed at home for about seven months (R. 159 at 
132). Zamora stated that he helped his mother and father up there working on the ranch 
in the state of Zacatecas (R. 159 at 132-133). Zamora testified that after, he went back to 
the United States where he stayed in Phoenix, Arizona where he stayed for approximately 
a week, and that after that he went to Atlanta, Georgia (R. 159 at 133-134). Zamora 
stated that he was in Atlanta for a year and a half or two years and at some point he was 
arrested there and brought back to Utah (R. 159 at 134). 
Zamora stated that he knows Beatriz Esparza that she is his sister-in-law; 
however, Zamora denied ever having sex or ever raping or ever KIDNAPING Esparza 
(R. 159 at 134). Zamora also denied being in the United States on October 15th and 16th 
of 1999 (R. 159 at 134). 
During cross-examination, Zamora acknowledged that he remembered Martin 
Chairez as a friend of his (R. 159 at 138). 
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STIPULATIONS BY THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANT 
Stipulation to results of Hair Analysis 
Alicia H. Cook, Counsel for the State, and Steven Shapiro, Counsel for the 
Defendant, stipulated to the following: 
In December of 2003, hairs taken from Ultiminio Zamora were 
submitted to the Utah Crime Laboratory by Kevin Judd, under crime lab 
#99-4012. The hairs obtained from Ultiminio Zamora were compared with 
hairs taken from the clothing worn by Beatriz Esparza on October 15th and 
16th of 1999 by Kevin L. Smith, a criminologist with the Utah Crime 
Laboratory. In a report dated January 9, 2004, Mr. Smith concluded that 
the hairs obtained from Ultiminio Zamora were not microscopically similar 
to the hairs taken from Beatriz Esparza's clothing (R. 159 at 100). 
Stipulation to results of Serology Analysis 
Alicia H. Cook, Counsel for the State, and Steven Shapiro, Counsel for the 
Defendant, stipulated to the following: 
On November 12, 1999, a sexual assault evidence collection kit was 
submitted to the Utah Crime Laboratory by Detective Jim Chandler under 
crime lab #99-4012. The evidence collection kit contained vaginal 
swabbing taken from Breatriz Esparza on October 16, 1999 by Su Bryner-
Brown at the Salt Lake Regional Medical Center. The vaginal swabs were 
analyzed for seminal fluid by Todd VanBuren, a criminologist at the Utah 
Crime Laboratory, on November 23, 1999. Seminal fluid was identified on 
the vaginal swabbing (R. 159 at 100-101). 
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Stipulation to result of DNA Analysis 
Alicia H. Cook, Counsel for the State, and Steven Shapiro, Counsel for the 
Defendant, stipulated to the following: 
On June 16, 2003, blood sample obtained from Ultiminio Zamora 
was submitted to the Utah Crime Laboratory by Kevin Judd under Crime 
Lab #99-4012. Louise E. Smith, a criminologist from the Utah Crime 
Laboratory, analyzed the seminal fluid taken from Beatriz Esparza's 
vaginal swabbing for purposes of DNA comparison. Ms. Smith found that 
the seminal fluid contained a major and a minor DNA profile or a mixture 
of DNA contributors. The major profile was the only profile that 
containing enough information for a scientifically acceptable comparison. 
In a report dated July 23, 2003, Ms. Smith concluded that the major 
profile from the vaginal swabbing did not match the DNA taken from 
Ultiminio Zamora's blood sample. 
On September 12, 2003 a blood sample obtained from Chris Garcia 
was admitted to the Utah Crime Laboratory by Kevin Judd in Crime Lab 
#99-4012. In a report dated September 25, 2003, Ms. Smith concluded that 
the major profile taken from Beatriz Esparza's vaginal swabbing matched 
the DNA taken from Chris Garcia's blood sample (R. 159 at 101 and 102). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When part of the voir dire of the jury was conducted in judge's chambers, outside 
of the presence of Zamora, he was denied his constitutional right to appear and defend in 
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person and by counsel. Such a right may not be denied by a court or be waived by 
counsel. Particularly, when a defendant is in custody, and therefore not a free agent, the 
duty is on the court to see that he is personally present at every stage of the trial. Because 
this argument was not preserved on the record, this Court should review Zamora's 
claimed error under the plain error doctrine and ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROBL IN NOT ENSURING 
THAT ZAMORA WAS PRESENT DURING ALL STAGES OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM OR HAD WAIVED ON THE RECORD HIS 
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
Zamora asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to be present at every 
stage of the criminal proceeding against him when part of the jury voir dire was 
conducted on the record, in judge's chambers, outside of his presence, and without any 
waiver of said right on the record (R. 163 at 39-55). 
It is settled that "[t]here is no doubt but that the constitutional right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime which may not 
be infringed or frittered away, and one which may not be denied by a court or be waived 
by counsel" State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah \9?>5)(ctimg Schafer v. State, 118 
Tex.Cr.R. 500, 40 S.W. (2d) 147; State v. Hutchinson, 163 La. 146, 111 So. 656). The 
same court stated that "[i]t is one thing for [ ] [a defendant] to absent himself when he is 
at liberty and can voluntarily do so, and quite another thing for the court to deprive him 
of any substantial right against his protest or even when, in some circumstances, he 
remains silent. Id. at 1056. 
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The Utah Supreme Court stated on another occasion that "[a] defendant charged 
with a crime is entitled to be present at all stages of trial. The right to appear and defend 
in person is a constitutional one, but may be waived under certain circumstances if the 
defendant voluntarily absents himself from the trial. State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937, 941 
(Utah 2003)(citing State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986). Furthermore, a[a]ny 
waiver of the right to be present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.'" State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 
1996)(quoting State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah. Ct.App. 1989). Finally, [a] 
defendant charged with a crime is entitled to be present at all stages of trial. Utah Const. 
Art. I § 12 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel. . ."); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (1999) ("In criminal 
prosecutions the defendant is entitled : (a) To appear in person and defend in person or 
by counsel; . . .") State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d 953, 965 (Utah 2002). 
Because no objection to Zamora's absence during the jury voir dire in the trial 
judge's chambers, Zamora asserts his claim under the plain error doctrine. This Court 
will review claims not preserved in the record for plain error. See State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that 
"(1) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, ie., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (1993). 
In State v. Hubbard, during the jury selection process, the judge, prosecutor, and 
defense counsel discussed matters with prospective jurors at sidebar, without the 
defendant present, and there was no evidence in the record that defendant objected to or 
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opposed not being present at sidebar, 48 P.3d at 958 (Utah 2002). Analyzing the case 
under the plain error doctrine, the Court assumed, without deciding the issue, that the 
defendant has a right to be present at sidebar conferences with potential jurors during the 
jury selection process, but concluded that the defendant waived the right in this case. Id. 
at 965. 
The case at bar is similar in many respects to Hubbard but also distinguishable in 
important respects. First, although neither Zamora nor his defense counsel, like 
Hubbard, objected to Zamora's absence nor asserted his right to be present during the 
discussions with individual jurors during voir dire, the discussions in Hubbard were 
conducted at a sidebar, presumably within sight in the courtroom. Hubbard, 48 P.3d at 
958. In the instance case, said discussions were held outside of the courtroom, in judge's 
chambers, where Zamora could not have observed the discussions, and thus could not 
have had the same opportunity to object on the record as did the defendant in Hubbard 
(R. 163 at 39). 
Second, the discussions in Hubbard were held off the record and therefore any 
harm the defendant may have suffered was speculative at best. Hubbard, 48 P.3d at 965. 
In Zamora's case, however, one of the juror's answers to one of the trial judge's 
questions in chambers outside of Zamora's presence, called into question the juror's 
objectivity and would have influenced Zamora's decisions on his choice of challenges, 
for cause and/or peremptory, to remove Mr. Erickson. Brian Erickson, one of the jurors 
ultimately empaneled to hear and decide the case, was asked by Judge Fuchs in chambers 
outside of Zamora's presence, "Do you feel that Mr. Zamora has any obligation to you to 
prove his innocence?" He responded, "Is that not why we're here?" (R. 163 at 50). 
Such an answer should have caused any defense counsel or defendant considerable 
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concern. When pressed further by the judge who asked, "But do you understand that he 
has no obligation to prove his innocence, the State has the obligation," Mr. Erickson 
somewhat equivocally answered, "All right, yeah." (R. 163 at 50). 
Therefore, the harm of not being present to hear Mr. Erickson5 s seemingly biased 
responses is apparent on the record in this case, something that could not be easily 
ascertained with any certainty in Hubbard. Hearing such seemingly biased responses 
from a prospective jurors certainly would have influenced Zamora's decisions regarding 
the use of for cause or peremptory challenges to remove said juror. Zamora's case, 
analyzed under the plain error doctrine, is therefore distinguishable from Hubbard for 
said reasons. 
POINT II 
THE PERFORMANCE OF ZAMORA'S TRIAL COUNSEL IN NOT ENSURING 
THAT ZAMORA WAS PRESENT DURING ALL STAGES OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM OR HAD WAIVED ON THE RECORD HIS 
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT, FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF 
REASONABLENESS 
Zamora asserts, in the alternative, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel, namely when his trial counsel failed to request the 
defendant's presence or to object to his absence during the jury voir dire conference in 
judge's chambers (R. 163 at 39-55). In order to establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would 
probably have been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 
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477 (Utah App. 1989). 
A. The Performance of Zamora's Trial Counsel Fell Below an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness. 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant 
must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,5 and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial.'"State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); accord State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993). 
To meet this prong, defendants "must prove specific, identified acts or omissions 
fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). "[B]efore we will reverse a conviction based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any conceivable 
tactical basis' for counsel's actions." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542 (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 
111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). 
1. There was no tactical purpose for not requesting Zamora 's presence, or 
objecting to his absence, at the jury voir dire conference in judge }s 
chambers 
First, Zamora asserts that defense counsel's failure to either assert Zamora's right 
to be present, or to object to his absence, at the jury voir dire discussions held in the 
judge's chambers served no purpose and was not trial strategy. Defense counsel is 
charged with knowing the law and should of known of Zamora's absolute right to be 
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present at all stages of the proceedings against him. He should have known, as stated in 
Aikers, that it "is a sacred right of one accused of crime which may not be infringed or 
frittered away, and is one which may not be denied by a court or be waived by counsel." 
State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d at 1055. Furthermore, in Hubbard, the Supreme Court assumed, 
without deciding the issue, that the defendant has a right to be present at sidebar 
discussions with potential jurors during the jury selection process for purposes of said 
appeal. State v. Hubbard, 48 P.3d at 965-966. 
Charged with knowing the case law above as it related to a defendant's right to be 
present at all stages of the criminal proceedings against him, defense counsel should have 
made sure to assert Zamora's right to be present in judge's chambers during the further 
jury voir dire during the jury selection process, or at the very least, objected to Zamora's 
absence without a waiver of said right by Zamora on the record. Therefore, trial 
counsel's failure to either assert Zamora's right to be present, or to object to his absence 
at the jury voir dire discussions in judge's chambers, constituted a deficient performance 
and satisfies the first prong of the Strickland test.. 
B. Zamora was Prejudiced by his Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. 
Zamora asserts that the harm he suffered in this case is two fold. First, as outlined 
above in Point I, the biased statements of the juror Mr. Erickson in judge's chambers 
and outside of Zamora's presence, prevented him from making an informed decision 
regarding the use of a challenge for cause to remove Mr. Erickson, or in the alternative, a 
26 
peremptory challenge. The empaneling of such a juror to hear and decide the case 
against Zamora would likely have had a profound effect injury deliberations to the 
detriment of Zamora's case. 
Second, Zamora asserts as suggested by some of the case law, that his 
constitutional right to be present at all stages of the proceeding against him is of such 
magnitude that any violation should not be considered harmless. In State v. Aikers, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is no doubt but that the constitutional right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime 
which may not be infringed or frittered away, and is one which may not be denied by a 
court or be waived by counsel," and that "[i]t is one thing for [a defendant] [ ] to absent 
himself when he is at liberty and can voluntarily do so, and quite another thing for the 
court to deprive him of any substantial right against his protest or even when, in some 
circumstances, he remains silent." Aikers, 51 P.2d at 1055-56. 
In the case at hand, although the record is silent as to Zamora personally, his 
defense counsel had a duty to safeguard Zamora's right to be present at all stages of the 
trial, including the further voir dire of jury members on the record in judge's chambers. 
There is, therefore, but for defense counsel's deficient performance, a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome regarding Zamora's convictions. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Zamora asks that this Court conclude that defense 
counsel was ineffective and that Zamora was prejudiced thereby, and/or that the trial 
court committed plain error which prejudiced him. As a result, the conviction should be 
reversed and Zamora granted a new trial. 
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Amend, I UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
/Rel ig ious and po l i t i ca l freedom J 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a. 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT HI 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in t ime of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in t ime of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seU 
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal act ions — Provis ions concerning — Due pro-> 
cess of l aw and jus t compensat ion clauses . ] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be-a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without jus t compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused. ] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shaft have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial b y jury in civi l cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of tr ial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
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AMENDMENT VIH 
fBail — Pun i shment J 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights re ta ined by people . ] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X -. 
[Powers reserved to s tates or people . ] 
The powers not delegated to the United States -by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restr ic t ion of judic ial power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens oi 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State; 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of Pres ident a n d Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, ai 
least, shall not be an inhabi tant of the same state witl 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person votec 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for a 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per 
.sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for a 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which list 
they shall sign and certify, and t ransmit sealed to the seat c 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi 
dent of the Senate;—The'President of the Senate shall, in th 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open a 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—Tb 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presiden 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of th 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person hav 
such majority, then from the persons having the highei 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for ? 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immed 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presiden 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation fro: 
each state having one vote; a quorum for th is purpose shs 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the state 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choic 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose 
President whenever, the right of choice shall devolve up' 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then t 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of t 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—T 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Preside] 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority oft 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person hav< 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, t 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for t 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligi 
to the ofhee of President shall be eligible to tha t of V5 
President of the United States. , 
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or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 9. [Excess ive ba i l and fines — Cruel punish-
ments . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be t reated 
with unnecessary rigorr 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial .by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the . jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer t han eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. . 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts o p e n — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any t r ibunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a pa r ty . . 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r ight to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by . an impartial jury of t h e county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her_ 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by s ta tute 
or rule in whole or in par t at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s ta tu te or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecut ion b y information or ind ic tment — 
Grand jury.] -
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted' by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by.information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as' prescribed by the Legislature-. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. i89t^ 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel tb» 
t ru th may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the matter, charged as libelous is true: 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends;' 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to deteimine the law and the fact.
 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. igc.6 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military/ 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. ISW 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. iz,m 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civi l power.] 
The mihtary shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power., and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec . 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the par ty shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for publ ic use . ] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation. . 1S9& 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws. ] 
All laws of a general na ture shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights reta ined by people . ] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. *896 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
Sec. 27. [ F u n d a m e n t a l r i gh t s . ] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is esseiitial 
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government. 1896 
